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Abstract 
Earlier studies on income inequality and crime have typically used total income 
or total earnings. However, it is quite likely that it is changes in permanent 
rather than in transitory income that affects crime rates. The purpose of this 
paper is therefore to disentangle the two effects by, first, estimating region-
specific inequality in permanent and transitory income and, second, estimating 
crime equations with the two separate income components as explanatory 
variables. The results indicate that it is important to separate the two effects; 
while an increase in the inequality in permanent income yields a positive and 
significant effect on total crimes and three different property crimes, an 
increase in the inequality in transitory income has no significant effect on any 
type of crime. Using a traditional, aggregate, measure of income yields mainly 
insignificant effects on crime. 
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1 Introduction 
Earlier studies on income inequality and crime have typically used inequality in 
total income or total earnings as explanatory variables. However, income can 
be considered as consisting of two parts, one permanent and one transitory, and 
it is quite likely that it is changes in the permanent part rather than in the 
transitory part that affects crime rates, as the two have different ramifications 
for the duration of inequality. An increase in the dispersion of permanent 
income leads to greater income inequality in both the short- and the long-term. 
An increase in the dispersion of transitory income, on the other hand, only 
creates short-term inequality. 
The purpose of this paper is to disentangle the effects from inequality in 
permanent income from the effects from inequality in transitory income on 
crime. This is done in two steps. In the first step, we estimate region-specific 
inequality in permanent and transitory income using a very rich dataset on 
Swedish individuals. While several previous studies have decomposed year-to-
year changes in inequality into its permanent and transitory components, this is 
the first time that these estimations have been carried out on a regional level.
1  
In the second step, we estimate crime equations with the two estimated income 
components as explanatory variables. This is, as far as we know, the first time 
that this separation of income has been used in the literature estimating the 
effects of income inequality on crime. 
The results indicate that it is important to separate the two effects; while an 
increase in the inequality in permanent income yields a positive and significant 
effect on property crime, an increase in the inequality in transitory income has 
no significant effect on any type of crime. When using a traditional, composite, 
measure of income, we get mainly insignificant effects on crime. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some 
theoretical considerations on the relationship between income inequality and 
crime, and section 3 presents the income data and estimates permanent and 
transitory income for each county in Sweden. Section 4 discusses the 
econometric specification of the crime equations and the data to be used when 
estimating them. Section 5 presents the results, and, finally, section 6 
concludes. 
                                                      
1 The previous studies include Moffitt & Gottschalk (1995, 2002) and Haider (2001) for the US, 
Dickens (2000) for the UK, Cappellari (2004) for Italy, and Gustavsson (2004a, b) for Sweden. 
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2  Income inequality and crime: 
theoretical considerations 
Why should there be an association between crime rates and income 
inequality? It turns out that both economic and sociological theory has linked 
income inequality to criminal activity. While economists have suggested that 
inequality may capture differential returns to criminal activity and, thereby, 
have an association with crime rates, sociologists have hypothesized that 
inequality and social welfare in general may work through other channels; 
inequality may be associated with lack of social capital, lack of upward 
mobility, or social disorganization, all of which may cause higher levels of 
crime.
2 
Ever since Becker’s seminal work in the late 1960s (Becker, 1968), 
economists have suggested that economic incentives for crimes are higher in 
areas with greater income inequality (see eg Ehrlich, 1973, Chiu & Madden, 
1998, Bourguignon, 2001, and Chisholm & Choe, 2005). In his work, Becker 
(1968) proposes an occupational choice model in which the incentives for 
individuals to commit crime are determined by the differential returns from 
legitimate and illegitimate pursuits.
3 
However, based on economic theory, the sign of the effect of income 
inequality on crime is ambiguous. This is because income inequality may also 
be associated with the level of protection from crime. Private crime protection 
measures may include guard dogs, bars on windows, electric fences, and alarm 
systems with armed security response. Chiu & Madden (1998) provide a model 
that allows for richer neighborhoods to have lower crime rates, partly because 
they may employ effective defense strategies against crime. 
Turning to sociological theories, it has been put forward that the prevalence 
of crime may be linked to a lack of upward mobility in society. Coser (1968, 
cited by Blau & Blau, 1982, p. 119) argues that people who perceive their 
poverty as permanent may be driven by hostile impulses rather than rational 
pursuit of their interests. Wilson & Daly (1997) hypothesize that sensitivity to 
                                                      
2 The discussion of these mechanisms follows Demombynes & Özler (2005). 
3 Hence, income inequality is supposed to be associated with crime levels via a relationship with 
the returns from crime and non-crime activities. 
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inequality, especially by those at the bottom, leads to higher risk tactics, such 
as crime, when the expected payoffs from low-risk tactics are poor. If income 
inequality is correlated with social mobility, then these theories imply a higher 
prevalence of criminal behavior in more unequal areas. 
Closely related to theories involving social mobility are those related to 
social disorganization and crime. In an influential paper, Merton (1938) 
proposes that the lack of upward mobility in a society, combined with a high 
premium on economic affluence results in anomie, a breakdown of standards 
and values. According to Merton, poverty or even “poverty in the midst of 
plenty” alone is not sufficient to induce high levels of crime. Only when their 
interaction with other interdependent social and cultural variables is 
considered, one can explain the association between crime and poverty. 
The above theories, connecting crime to inequality, have spawned a large 
number of empirical studies. Most of these have estimated whether crime rates 
are affected by different measures of income inequality, using such measures as 
the Gini coefficient, the variance of log income, and different percentile 
quotients, like the 90/10-quotient. These different measures do however yield 
quite different conclusions in different studies. For example, while certain 
studies using US data find a significant and positive relation between the Gini 
coefficient and crime rates (see Freeman, 1999, for an overview), Nilsson 
(2004) find no significant effects from the Gini coefficient on crime rates using 
Swedish data. 
We believe that one explanation for the diverging results in the literature 
may be due to the use of an aggregate measure of income. It is a relatively old 
thought in economics, dating back at least to Friedman & Kuznets (1954), that 
an individual’s income in a given period can be divided into a permanent and a 
transitory component. Since changes in permanent and transitory income have 
different ramification for the duration of inequality, it is quite likely that they 
will have different impacts on the crime rates. From the sociological theories 
related to above, it is clear that it is an individual’s permanent position in 
society that is the main factor affecting one’s decision to commit crime or not, 
not the individual’s transitory deviation from the permanent position. From the 
economic theories, it is however not clear whether it is inequality in permanent 
or in transitory income that matters. Using an aggregate measure of income, as 
the earlier studies have done, will however restrict inequality in permanent and 
transitory income to have the same impact. 
To make the argument clear, consider the following model: 
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(1)  it i it yu ε =+, 
 
where   is the log of total income in period t for individual i,  it y
2 (, ) iu uu σ    is 
permanent income for individual i which is assumed to be constant over the 
life-cycle and have a constant variance, and 
2 (0, ) iid it ε ε σ    capture transitory 
stochastic deviations from permanent earnings. With this model, the cross-
sectional variance of income in year   is:  t
 
(2) 
22 () it u Var y ε σ σ =+, 
 
that is, the variance of total income is the sum of the variance of permanent 
income and the variance of transitory income. 
Equation (2) illustrates the potential pitfall of using total income. For 
example, suppose that changes in the variance of total income is used to study 
whether income inequality can explain differences in crime rates across 
different regions. If only permanent inequality affect crime rates, equation (2) 
shows that such a study has rather limited prospects of obtaining clear or 
systematic evidence. A region with both low inequality in permanent income 
and low crime rates may have a large dispersion in transitory earnings, and 
hence a large cross-sectional variance in income. The results may hence show 
that inequality has no, or even a negative, effect on crime. 
In the end, it is an empirical question whether inequality in permanent 
income has another impact on crime rates than inequality in transitory income. 
Therefore, the aim with this paper is to allow the two income components in 
equation (2) to have separate effects on the crime rates. 
 
 
3  Permanent and transitory income 
3.1  An econometric model of income dynamics 
Even though the permanent earnings model presented in the preceding section 
is intuitive, an empirical model of income dynamics must have several addi-
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tional properties. To begin with, the variance of income must be allowed to 
change over time. The following enhanced model allows for this:
4 
 
(3)  it t i it yp u ε =+ . 
 
In equation (3), the variable   and its year-specific factor loading,  , 
capture permanent, or persistent, income. As an approximation, the variable u  
can be thought of as capturing all individual characteristics that matter for 
permanent relative income and   as reflecting the time-varying price of these 
characteristics, but in practice, this specification is simply a means to allow the 








capture stochastic transitory deviations from permanent income but its variance 
is now year specific, denoted 
2





t it t u Var y p ε σ σ =+ , 
 




, (, ) it i t s t t s u Cov y y p p σ −− = . 
 
Equation (4) demonstrates that an increase in the dispersion of either 
permanent or transitory income both generates increased cross-sectional 
income dispersion. The character of the change depends crucially, however, on 
which of these two components that changes. A persistent rise in the permanent 
component increases long-run inequality as the relative labor market advantage 
of workers with chronically high income is enhanced. An increase in the 
transitory component, without any change in the dispersion of permanent 
income, generates increased cross-sectional income dispersion by raising year-
to-year income instability but with no change in long-term inequality. 
Changes in the permanent and transitory components are closely related to 
changes in measures of income mobility, ie changes in the rate at which 
individuals shift positions in the income distribution (transition across quantiles 
                                                      
4 The description of this model draws heavily on Baker &  Solon (2003).  
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of the income distribution). Increases in the permanent component will cause 
the auto-covariances to grow in greater proportion than the variances, so auto-
correlations increase. In contrast, increases in the transitory component alone 
will only increase the variances, so auto-correlations decrease. Equal propor-
tional increases in the two components will leave auto-correlations unchanged, 
even though individual income instability will be increased. Changes in auto-
correlations thus identify changes in the ratio of persistent to transitory income 
inequality.
5 
Previous studies have shown that more additional features must be added to 
a model of income dynamics if one should correctly estimate changes in 
permanent and transitory inequality (see the discussion in Baker & Solon, 
2003, and the references therein). In particular, the permanent and transitory 
income components should be allowed to vary with age and transitory shocks 
should be allowed to last for several periods. 












(8)  ,1 ,1 i t it it i t ε ρε δν ν −− =++ , 
 
                                                      
5 A more detailed discussion of the connection to income mobility can be found in Moffitt & 
Gottschalk (1995). 
6 Some of the models that we have experimented with produce negative estimates of some of the 
variances or show other clear signs of being over-specified – these models are naturally 
discarded. The model presented here is the most advanced possible without over-specifying the 
model. We have not applied Newey’s (1985) specification test as the previous literature on 
income dynamics show that this test always (at least in the studies that we are aware of) rejects 
the hypothesis that the right model is specified. The drawbacks with this test for assessing the 
goodness of fit of models of income dynamics are further discussed in Baker (1997) and Baker & 
Solon (2003). A general critic of tests such as that proposed in Newey (1985) is also found in 
Leamer (1983). 
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where   indicates age. Beginning with the permanent component, equations 
(6) and (7) model permanent income as a random walk in age where the 
innovation at each age is  .
a
2
, ~iid(0, ) ia ra r σ ,
7 The innovation variance at each age, 
2
, ra σ , is allowed to take on one value up until age 34 and another one thereafter. 
We also estimate the variance of an initial permanent shock that capture the 
accumulation of individuals’ permanent shocks up to the start of the sample 
period, denoted  . We found that not allowing for age varying permanent 
shocks produced noticeable different results as well as substantially larger 
standard errors for the estimated parameters. By allowing for age variation we 
recognize that younger individuals are more likely to be engaged in job-
shopping and have no job-securing tenure and are therefore more likely to 
experience larger permanent shocks to income. 
2
u σ
For the transitory component,   in equation (6) is an age-specific param-




is allowed to take on three different values, one for individuals aged no more 
than 34 years, one for individuals aged 35 to 44, and one for individuals aged 
45 and above. Like for the permanent component we found age variation to be 
important for the precision of the estimates. Equation (8) models deviations 
from permanent income as a first order autoregressive moving average process 
with a year-specific innovation ν , which in turn has a year-specific variance, 
denoted 
2
t v σ . 
Although the model in equations (6)-(8) is more complex than that in 
equation (3), the intuition from the simpler model still holds. An increase in the 
permanent variance preserves the order of individuals in the income 
distribution but spreads them out further, and this greater spread remains year 
after year. An increase in the transitory variance leads to more scrambling of 
workers’ order in the annual income distribution, and the scrambling gets 
redone every year. 
 
                                                      
7 A random walk specification is also used, among others, in Dickens (2000), Moffitt & 
Gottschalk (2002), and Gustavsson (2004a, b). The use of a “random growht model” for 
permanent earnigs results in negative estimates of some of its variances; the same results for 
Sweden is also found, and discussed, in Gustavsson (2004a, b).  
8 In this model, the terms “permanent” and “transitory” are questionable. To be consistent with 
previous studies, however, we use the term permanent for the non-mean reverting component 
and transitory for the mean reverting component. 
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3.2  Income data and estimation methodology 
To calculate permanent and transitory income inequality from 1974 to 2000 we 
use the register-based longitudinal database LINDA, constructed to be cross-
sectionally representative of the Swedish population each year.
9 The dataset is 
large; it contains 3.35 percent of the Swedish population each year corre-
sponding to over 300,000 individuals. An attractive feature of the database is 
that attrition from the sample can be due only to death or migration. Infor-
mation about individuals’ incomes comes from tax reports, so the income vari-
able is free of the measurement errors that are common in survey data such as 
recall errors, rounding errors and top-coding. 
The definition of an individual’s income used in the analysis is the log of 
total earnings from all jobs during a year (including sickness benefits); like 
Nilsson (2004) we use this income definition since it is the most consistent 
over time available in the LINDA database.
10 Consequently, our inequality 
measures will to a large extent reflect inequality in labor market outcomes. 
However, labor earnings are the primary source of income for a majority of 
people and therefore most likely highly correlated with alternative measures of 
income.
11 
To estimate the parameters of equations (6)-(8) we employ the minimum 
distance estimator described in Chamberlain (1984) and Abowd & Card 
(1989). This means that variances and auto-covariances of income constitute 
the dependent variable in the estimations. To calculate these we first, for each 
county and year 1974 to 2000, select all males 20 to 59 years old with positive 
income; thus the resulting panels are unbalanced as individuals may have 
missing values for some years.
12 This design permits us to use the largest 
possible sample in the construction of each element of the auto-covariance 
matrices. The restriction to males is because the large changes in female labor 
                                                      
9 The registers are maintained by Statistics Sweden; see Edin & Fredriksson (2000) for details. 
10 See Edin & Fredriksson (2000) for a detailed description of how the earnings measure in 
LINDA is constructed.  
11 Of course, other measures of income, preferable disposable family income, could yield 
different estimates in how the permanent and transitory variances have evolved over time. 
However, since such a measure is not available in LINDA, we focus on labor earnings solely 
since this measure is the most straightforward to interpret.    
12 Because data on income stem from tax-reports we must recognize that there is an annual 
income threshold for being forced to fill a tax report. The highest threshold is for 1974; 21,213 
real SEK in 2000. Our definition of positive income is thus real income above the 1974 
threshold. 
IFAU – Inequality and crime: separating the effects of  permanent and transitory income  10 
force participation during the sample period would confound an analysis of 
female income (this restriction is standard in the literature on permanent and 
transitory inequality).
13 The resulting total sample sizes for each county range 
from 2,463 (Jämtland) to 31,585 (Stockholm) individuals.
14 It is worth pointing 
out that the sample sizes for the counties in many cases actually match the total 
sample size in the PSID used in the US studies by Haider (2000) and Moffitt & 
Gottschalk (1995, 2002), and in several cases are larger. 
In constructing the auto-covariance matrices for different cohorts we 
employ the methodology used by Moffitt & Gottschalk (1995). For each year, 
individuals are categorized into four 10-year age cohorts: 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 
and 50-59. This level of disaggregation assures a minimum of 160 individuals 
in the calculations of the auto-covariances, though a majority of the 
calculations invoke a substantially larger sample. In year   of the data, we 
divide the individuals into these four age groups and follow them through to 
year  , year  , etc until either the end of our data is reached (the year 
2000) or until the age interval in question reaches beyond age 59.
t
1 t + 2 t +
1 +
15 For 
example, the 40-49 cohort in 1974 can be followed through to 1984 when they 
are 50-59, but no further. For each of the four cohorts, the variance for the 
initial year, t , and the auto-covariances between year   and each subsequent 
year are calculated. A fresh set of cohorts is begun in each year, so in year t  
individuals are again divided into the four age groups 20-29, 30-39, etc and the 
variance for t  and the auto-covariances between year t
t
1 +
1 +  and each 
subsequent year are calculated. The end result of this procedure is 1004 unique 
elements in each county’s covariance matrix. This way of constructing the 
covariance matrix ensures that every individual’s element is included uniquely 
into one cell of the matrix, at the same time allowing us to maximize the 
number of elements since we can use a fully unbalanced panel with constant 
age intervals in each year. 
Each county’s resulting auto-covariance matrix is used in the minimum 
distance estimation of equations (6)-(8). Basically, the implied variances and 
auto-covariances of the model are fitted to the corresponding empirical 
                                                      
13 The results would be confounded because we estimate a model of income, not of entry and 
exit; appending a model of entry and exit is beyond the scope of this paper. 
14 The county of Gotland is excluded due to the very small sample size and because most of the 
crimes are commited by tourists. 
15 The individuals  in the age group 50-59 can not be followed at all. However their incomes are 
used to construct diagonal elements of the covaraince matrix, ie to calculate the variances. 
IFAU – Inequality and crime: separating the effects of  permanent and transitory income  11  
moments in the data by non-linear least squares. In these estimations the age of 
the cohort aged 20-29 is defined to be 25, the age of the cohort aged 30-39 is 




Here we will briefly describe the estimation results for three selected counties. 
Table B1 in Appendix B contains the parameter estimates and associated 
standard errors for the county of Stockholm ( 31,585) n =  together with results 
for the most northern and southern counties - Norrbotten ( 4,841) n =  and 
Skåne   respectively. ( 17,724) n =
16 Based on the parameter estimates we can 
obtain age-specific estimates of permanent and transitory inequality. 
Figure 1a-c contains the predicted evolution of permanent and transitory 
inequality from 1974 to 2000 for individuals defined to be 45 years old (ie in 
the age interval 40-49) together with the predicted variance from the full model 
(the variance of permanent income plus the variance of transitory income) and 
the actual variance for 45-year olds. The permanent and transitory variance 
both make up around half of the total variance in all three counties. One would 
perhaps expect the transitory variance to be smaller, but the use of an unbal-
anced panel design tends to boost the transitory variance; see Gustavsson 
(2004b) for a comparison of results from unbalanced and balanced panel 
designs.
17 Unlike previous studies we also include immigrants, who are likely 
to have more transitory income due to higher unemployment rates. 
 
                                                      
16 For corresponding estimates for the whole of Sweden during this period, see Gustavsson 
(2004a, b). 
17 The higher transitory variance will not affect our final crime estimates as long as the changes 
over time are unaffected. Note also that there is no a priori reason to prefer a balanced panel 
since this design induces potentially severe sample selection effects as only individuals with 
positive earning during all sample years are included.     
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Cross-sectional inequality among 45-year olds is largest in Stockholm and 
smallest in Norrbotten. The estimates of the permanent and transitory 
component are more irregular for Norrbotten, likely reflecting the smaller 
sample for this county (due to fewer people living there). There are year-to-
year differences in the evolution of permanent and transitory variances across 
the counties up until the mid 1990s. The major movements are similar though, 
with only small changes up to the late 1980s and large increases during the 
deep Swedish recession in the first half of the 1990s. There are, however, larger 
differences from the mid 1990s as permanent inequality levels of in Stockholm 
but decreases in Skåne and Norrbotten. Transitory inequality also displays a 
stronger increase in Skåne and Norrbotten than in Stockholm during this 
period. Overall, there are some important cross-county differences in the 
evolution of inequality – especially during the 1990s. 
As our econometric model of income dynamics results in age-specific 
estimates of permanent and transitory inequality, it is natural to ask which age 
we should use when we investigate the connection to crime rates.
18 A first 
suggestion might be to use the estimates for the youngest age, ie for those in 
                                                      
18 Since, by construction, the proportional changes over time within a county are the same for all 
ages, we cannot include several different ages since these would be perfectly collinear. 
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the age interval 20-29 (defined to be 25 years old in the estimations), since 
young individuals commit most crimes. However, our estimates show that the 
magnitudes and life-cycle patterns of permanent and transitory inequality differ 
across counties (different estimates of the random walk variances and of the   
parameters). To illustrate the meaning of this, Figure 2 graphs the life-cycle 
pattern of permanent inequality holding time constant, for the county of 
Stockholm, Norrbotten, and Skåne. The figure shows that inequality among 25-
year olds actually is largest in Norrbotten, but also that this is a quickly passing 
state as the age-inequality pattern is much steeper in Stockholm and Skåne. 
Hence, even if inequality is low in Stockholm among individuals aged 25, 
those with low expected permanent income over the life-cycle will have much 
lower expected relative income in the future than the corresponding 25-year 
old individuals in Norrbotten. Since, according to economic theories along the 
lines of Becker (1968), expected future relative income is closely connected to 
the decision to commit crime, it is important to take account of the life-cycle 
differences across counties when estimating the connection between permanent 
inequality and crime rates. 
a q
 
Figure 2: Permanent inequality over the life-cycle in the county 





























To get measures of inequality that take account of the cross-county 
differences in life-cycle patterns, we compute the average permanent and 
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transitory inequality over the life cycle for each county. That is, for a given 
year and county we calculate the permanent variance for each age (25, 26, and 
so forth up to 55), and then compute the average of these variances. The 
corresponding is done for transitory inequality. These averages of permanent 




4  Data and econometric specification 
of crime equation 
When estimating the crime equations, we will use panel data from Swedish 
counties. In the panel, we observe the 21 counties over the time period 1974-
2000. We will investigate the effects of income inequality on four different 
types of crime: total crime, shoplifting, auto theft, and burglary. Time-series 
graphs of these crime categories are available in Appendix C.
19 
We assume that there is an underlying process that connects per capita 
crime rates, Cit, and the two measures of income inequality, PERMit and 
TRANSit, in county i = 1, . . . , N at time t = 1, . . . , T such that 
 
it it TRANS PERM
it e C
β α + =  
 
where PERMit is the estimated inequality in permanent income and TRANSit is 
the estimated inequality in transitory income and where we are interested in 
estimating the parameters α  and  β. Since crime rates are non-negative, the 
exponential form is suitable. Furthermore, for the exponential form, any 
changes are proportional to the crime rate, which seems more plausible than for 
example constant changes produced by a linear relation. 
In order to avoid misspecifications due to omitted variables, we control for 
observable as well as unobservable variables that might explain the crime rate 
and that might be correlated with the two inequality measures. The observable 
variables,  xit, that we use are crime-specific clear-up rates (proxy for the 
                                                      
19 The crime data is defined as the reported crime per 100,000 inhabitants and year, and it is 
collected from The Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ). With total crime we 
mean all reported crimes (not just the total of the crime categories that we use in this paper). 
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probability of getting caught), unemployment rate, share of men in the age 
interval 15-24, share of foreign citizens, and share of the population that is 
divorced.
20 The unobservable variables are county-specific fixed effects, fi, to 
control for unobserved variables that affects the crime rate and that stay 
constant over time for each county, time-specific fixed effects, λt, to control for 
unobserved macro-economic shocks that affect the crime rate in each county in 
the same way in a given year, and county-specific time trends, trendi. The fixed 
county- and time-effects might be correlated with the observable variables. 
Furthermore, the crime rate can also be affected by disturbances, εit. Thus, we 
have the following relationship to be estimated for the crime rate 
 
(9)   
it i t i it it it trend f x TRANS PERM
it e C
ε λ δ β α + + + + + + =
'  
 
To estimate equation (9), we take the logarithm of it and use OLS to 
estimate the following familiar log-linear fixed effect model
21: 
 
(10)        ( ) it i t i it it it it trend f x TRANS PERM C ε λ δ β α + + + + + + = '   ln  
 
There are three things that we have to deal with when estimating equation 
(10). First, it is quite likely that the disturbances are heteroscedastic. Crimes are 
discrete events and the number of crimes committed is an integer. While this is 
not a problem for larger populations, for smaller populations it is, since the 
discrete nature of the crimes then will transfer to the crime rate, which is our 
dependent variable. For a population of 5,000, one additional crime corre-
sponds to 20 crimes per 100,000 inhabitants. Since the precision of crime rate 
estimates as a consequence will depend on the population size, we cannot 
expect the variance of the regression errors to be homoscedastic, if we estimate 
equation (10) with common methods. The smaller the population is, the larger 
is the variance.
22 We take care of this problem by estimating robust standard 
errors. Second, if there is a serial correlation in the error process (that is, if the 
crime rates are serially correlated), the resulting standard errors are inconsis-
                                                      
20 These are control variables that are typically used when estimating crime equations; see, eg, 
Raphael & Winter-Ebmer (2001), Levitt & Donohue (2001) and Edmark (2005). 
21 The log-linear fixed effect model has been frequently used in papers estimating crime 
equations; see, eg, Raphael & Winter-Ebmer (2001) and the references cited therein. 
22 See Osgood (2000) for a discussion in a cross-sectional setting. 
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tently estimated and may lead to severely biased estimates in small samples 
(see, eg Kezdi, 2002, and Bertrand et al., 2004). Therefore, we allow the errors 
to be correlated over time within each county.
23 Third, since PERMit and 
TRANSit are estimated variables, their estimated standard errors might be 






For comparison reasons we start by using a traditional, aggregate, measure of 
income when calculating income inequality. Three measures are used: the 
predicted variance (which is the sum of the estimated variances in permanent 
and transitory income; cf equation (2)), the Gini coefficient, and the variance. 
The results of including these measures in equation (10) are presented in Table 
1. 
If it is the case that permanent income has an effect on crime while 
transitory income does not, then we might end up with the false result of 
insignificant effects when using an aggregate income measure. This is also 
what we mainly get; none of the measures we use for income inequality enters 
significantly for the categories total crimes, auto theft and burglary.
25 For 
shoplifting, however, all three measures enter significantly at the five percent 
significance level, indicating that the larger the income inequality is, the more 
shoplifting we observe. 
Next we turn to the, for the purpose of this paper, more interesting question 
of whether the results in Table 1 change when we separate aggregate income 
into a permanent and a transitory part. The results are presented in Table 2. For 
each crime category, we present two different sets of estimates; in column (1) 
we present the results when we don’t control for the crime-specific clear-up 
rate and in column (2) we present the results when we control for the clear-up 
rate.
26 The reason for this division is the potential problems the endogeneity of 
the clear-up rate might cause in interpreting the coefficients for the permanent 
                                                      
23 Technically, this was done in STATA by clustering on county. 
24 We use 1000 bootstrap replications to estimate the confidence intervals. 
25 These results are in line with Nilsson (2004). 
26 In Appendix D we also present the corresponding when weighted least squares is used. 
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and transitory income variables.
27 In parenthesis, we present the traditionally 
estimated standard errors. However, for the two income variables these 
estimates are biased since the variables are estimated. Therefore, we rely on 
bootstrap confidence interval when making inference for the income 
variables.
28 98 percent bootstrap confidence intervals are presented within 
brackets. 
From the results in Table 2, it is clear that it is important to decompose 
income; while the inequality in permanent income enters statistically 
significant in all estimations (the four 98 percent bootstrap confidence intervals 
never cover the zero; as a matter of fact, all 1000 bootstrap estimates are 
positive for all crime categories), the inequality in transitory income never 
enters significantly. It hence seems like it is inequality in permanent income – 
and not in transitory income - that is important in determining property crime 
(it can be noted that, compared to the results in Table 1, the result for 
shoplifting are strengthened when permanent income is used instead of 
aggregate income). 
The results for the other variables in Table 1 and 2 are in line with those in 
previous studies - with the noticeable exception of the unemployment rate 
which enters insignificantly in all specifications but one. This result for the 
unemployment rate is perhaps not surprising as compared to the bulk of the 
earlier studies aiming at estimating the effect of unemployment on crime (for a 
discussion on this issue, see Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 2001). However, it is 
rather surprising given the results in more recent work, such as Raphael and 
Winter-Ebmer (2001), Nilsson and Agell (2003), and Edmark (2005). It is 
especially surprising given that we are using the same type of data as in 
Edmark (county-level data for Sweden). One explanation for the different 
                                                      
27 As can be seen from Table 2, the estimates for the two income variables are very similar in 
columns (1) and (2), indicating that the clear-up rate does not cause any problems in interpreting 
the coefficients for the income variables. Due to space constraints in Table 1, we did not report 
the results when the clear-up rates where included in those regressions. However, when the clear-
up rates where included, we obtained very similar results for the income variables as those 
reported in Table 1. 
28 In each bootstrap iteration, we first draw individuals with replacement from the income data 
base (ie, from the LINDA data base). Then we use the procedure presented in section 3 to 
estimate the county-specific inequalities in permanent and transitory income. Finally, we use the 
estimated county-specific inequalities in permanent and transitory income and estimate the crime 
equations. This procedure is repeated 1000 times, providing us with 1000 estimates on the 
coefficients for the two income variables. 
IFAU – Inequality and crime: separating the effects of  permanent and transitory income  19  
results could be the disaggregation of the income variable into its two 
components, as done in this paper. However, from the results in Table 1 where 
total income is used, this does not seem to be the explanation. The main 
differences compared to the study by Edmark, besides the income variable, are 
that we have a longer time period (although covering the time period used by 
her) and a different functional form (she is using a log-log specification). This 
might indicate that the results for the unemployment variable can be sensitive 
to the choice of time period or choice of functional form. 
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Table 1. Estimates when using inequality in aggregate measure of income.  
  Total crime  Shoplifting  Auto theft  Burglary 
(1)    (2) (3) (1)    (2) (3) (1) (2)  (3) (1) (2) (3)
Predict. Var.                      0.023 1.191     0.783 -0.241
  (0.200)                    (0.443)** (0.576) (0.467)
Gini                      -0.111   5.132 0.759 -1.460
                      (0.618) (2.321)** (2.640) (1.271)
Variance                      -0.002  1.382 0.547 -0.321
                      (0.194) (0.624)** (0.611) (0.485)
Unemployed                          1.514 1.540 1.523 -1.054 -1.404 -1.108 2.850 3.008 2.942 0.458 0.604 0.482
  (0.986)                        (0.974) (0.969) (2.114) (2.145) (2.158) (2.134) (2.269) (2.155) (1.239) (1.255) (1.244)
Men  15-24                          5.251 5.331 5.289 -11.442 -11.677 -11.591 12.224 13.073 12.599 2.285 2.531 2.389
  (3.589)                        (3.595) (3.614) (14.305) (13.452) (14.019) (9.847) (9.776) (9.924) (5.844) (5.675) (5.848)
Foreign                    4.845 4.741 4.813 1.144 3.426 1.883  4.398 3.964 4.226 2.771 2.073 2.608
 (2.188)** (2.146)** (2.222)** (6.504)  (5.401)                (6.001) (6.747) (7.388) (6.919) (3.859) (3.873) (3.783)
Divorced                          11.642 11.476 11.545 -1.589 -1.453 -2.770 48.172 45.599 46.264 27.934 27.912 28.197
  (6.640)*                (6.527)* (6.545)* (17.229) (17.561) (16.627) (17.016)** (16.190)** (16.653)** (9.504)*** (9.045)*** (9.142)***
Observations  540              540 540 520 520 520  540 540 540 540 540  540 
R-squared 0.94                        0.94 0.94 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.91
               
Notes.  Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. Time dummies, county-specific fixed effects and county-specific time 
trends are included in all specifications. Clustering is made on counties (allowing for autocorrelation in the residuals). 




Table 2. Estimates when using inequality in permanent and transitory income.  
  Total crime  Shoplifting  Auto theft  Burglary 
                  (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Permanent                1.247 1.409 2.789 2.562  1.839 1.838 0.534 0.715
          (0.444)**  (0.467)***  (0.726)***  (0.702)***  (0.943)* (0.917)* (0.842) (0.842)
[98% bootstrap CI]  [1.15  1.50]  [1.31  1.68]  [2.09  3.12]  [1.93  2.97]  [1.30  2.14]  [1.30  2.18]  [0.38  0.96]  [0.57  1.15] 
Transitory             -0.303 -0.338 0.811  0.463  0.501 0.534 -0.448 -0.445
  (0.261)              (0.259) (0.543) (0.521)  (0.618) (0.608) (0.510) (0.520)
[98% bootstrap CI]  [-0.47  0.16]  [-0.48  0.14]  [-0.41  1.25]  [-0.58  1.06]  [-0.46  1.02]  [-0.40  1.01]  [-0.64  -.31]  [-0.64  0.30] 
Clear-up rate                 0.033 2.411  -0.619 0.012
             (0.239)   (0.626)***  (0.286)** (0.078)
Unemployed                1.249 1.352 -1.368 0.017  2.620 2.588 0.290 0.170
 (0.881)  (0.759)*  (2.091)  (2.105)  (2.138)        (2.188) (1.311) (1.327)
Men 15-24  6.307  6.477  -10.224  -6.553  13.137        10.418 2.955 2.982
                (3.065)* (3.092)** (13.690) (11.560)  (9.847) (9.770) (5.690) (5.908)
Foreign                6.514 5.936 3.239 3.176  5.840 3.714 3.829 2.793
          (2.143)***  (2.312)**  (6.402)  (5.358)  (6.692) (6.633) (4.401) (4.847)
Divorced               10.206 5.352 -4.537 2.532  46.932 49.526 27.025 25.673
          (6.275)  (6.129)  (17.475)  (17.435)  (17.055)** (17.897)** (9.398)*** (9.655)**
Observations                540 520 520 520  540 520 540 520
R-squared                0.95 0.95 0.97 0.97  0.92 0.92 0.91 0.91
Notes. See notes to Table 1.   
6 Conclusions 
Earlier studies on income inequality and crime have used inequality in total 
income or total earnings as explanatory variable. However, from sociological 
theories on inequality and crime, it is rather an individual’s permanent position 
in society that is the main factor affecting one’s decision to commit crime or 
not, not the individual’s transitory deviation from the permanent position, 
implying that it is the inequality in permanent income, and not in transitory 
income, that is the important determinant for crime. Although less clear, this 
can also be the prediction from economic theories. Using an aggregate measure 
of income, as the earlier studies have done, will however restrict inequality in 
permanent and transitory income to have the same impact, making it difficult to 
obtain systematic evidence if only one of the components matter (or if the two 
components matter to different degrees). 
We have in this paper investigated whether the effects from inequality in 
permanent income on crime differ from the effects from inequality in transitory 
income on crime. To that end, we started out by estimating, using very rich 
income data from Sweden, region-specific inequality in permanent and 
transitory income. Then we used the two estimated income components as 
explanatory variables in four different crime equations; total crime, shoplifting, 
auto theft, and burglary. 
The results indicate that it is crucially important to separate the two effects; 
while an increase in the inequality in permanent income yields a positive and 
significant effect on total crimes and the three different property crimes, an 
increase in the inequality in transitory income has no significant effect on any 
type of crime. Using a traditional, aggregate, measure of income yields mainly 
insignificant effects on crime. 
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Appendix A: The minimum distance 
estimation 
The parameters of the model in equations (6)-(8) are estimated by applying the 
minimum distance estimator of Chamberlain (1984). Specifically, let C  
contain the distinct elements of the population auto-covariance matrix of   
for cohort b  and let C be an aggregate vector stacked with the C  vectors. Let 
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the model’s moment restrictions. Our model then implies that the general 
variance element in   is  C
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The vector   is estimated by the sample counterpart C, and θ is chosen to 
minimize a distance function 
C ˆ ˆ
 
(A3)  ,  )) ˆ ( ˆ ( ) ) ˆ ( ˆ ( θ C W θ C D f f − ′ − =
 
where   is a positive definite weighting matrix.  W
The asymptotically optimal choice of   is the inverse of a matrix that 
consistently estimates the covariance matrix of C. However, Altonji and 
Segall (1996) and Clark (1996) provide Monte Carlo evidence of potentially 
serious finite sample bias in the estimate of θ using this approach.
W
29 We 
therefore follow the practice of the most recent literature and use the identity 
matrix as the weighting matrix. This “equally weighted minimum distance 
estimation” amounts to using non-linear least squares to fit   to C.  ) ˆ (θ f ˆ
                                                      
29 This bias arises because of correlated sampling errors in the second and fourth moments of 
income.   
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As outlined in Chamberlain (1984), auto-correlation and heteroskedasticity 
robust standard errors for θ are obtained from the formula  ˆ
 
(A4)  , 
11 () ()
−− ′′′ GG GV GGG
 
where   is the gradient matrix  G () f ∂ ∂ θθ  evaluated at θ and V is a block 
diagonal matrix where the diagonal contains the estimated covariance matrices 
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Appendix B: Estimates of income 
dynamics 
Table B1. Estimates of income dynamics for three Swedish counties. 
  Stockholm Norrbotten  Skåne 
Permanent component         
2
u σ   0.029 (0.003) 0.034 (0.007) 0.028  (0.003) 
2
,26 34 r σ −
2
  0.011 (0.001) 0.003 (0.001) 0.006  (0.001) 
,35 55 r σ −   0.002 (0.0002) 0.002 (0.0004) 0.003  (0.0004) 
74 p   1.000  1.000  1.000   
75 p   0.947 (0.045) 0.929 (0.123) 1.005  (0.064) 
76 p   0.964 (0.045) 1.109 (0.137) 1.053  (0.065) 
77 p   0.958 (0.043) 1.063 (0.131) 1.070  (0.065) 
78 p   0.948 (0.042) 1.026 (0.122) 1.026  (0.062) 
79 p   0.958 (0.041) 1.071 (0.123) 1.054  (0.062) 
80 p   0.953 (0.041) 1.105 (0.125) 1.056  (0.062) 
81 p   0.941 (0.039) 1.060 (0.118) 1.037  (0.060) 
82 p   0.967 (0.040) 1.185 (0.130) 1.059  (0.061) 
83 p   0.938 (0.039) 1.154 (0.125) 1.046  (0.060) 
84 p   0.948 (0.039) 1.154 (0.122) 1.043  (0.059) 
85 p   0.945 (0.038) 1.131 (0.119) 1.058  (0.059) 
86 p   0.960 (0.039) 1.045 (0.112) 1.057  (0.059) 
87 p   0.993 (0.040) 1.096 (0.116) 1.005  (0.056) 
88 p   0.963 (0.038) 1.016 (0.107) 1.014  (0.056) 
89 p   0.937 (0.038) 0.961 (0.102) 1.023  (0.057) 
90 p   1.004 (0.040) 1.069 (0.112) 1.075  (0.059) 
91 p   1.088 (0.043) 1.126 (0.117) 1.109  (0.061) 
92 p   1.129 (0.044) 1.229 (0.126) 1.156  (0.063) 
93 p   1.199 (0.046) 1.161 (0.119) 1.156  (0.063) 
94 p   1.215 (0.047) 1.298 (0.130) 1.193  (0.064) 
95 p   1.169 (0.044) 1.315 (0.130) 1.188  (0.063) 
96 p   1.171 (0.043) 1.326 (0.131) 1.193  (0.063) 
97 p   1.179 (0.043) 1.330 (0.130) 1.152  (0.061) 
98 p   1.171 (0.043) 1.266 (0.124) 1.134  (0.060) 
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99 p   1.196 (0.043) 1.099 (0.107) 1.149  (0.060) 
00 p   1.200 (0.043) 1.222 (0.118) 1.128  (0.059) 
Transitory component         
25 34 q −   1.000  1.000  1.000   
35 44 q −   0.723 (0.006) 0.689 (0.014) 0.690  (0.007) 
45 55 q −   0.684 (0.006) 0.621 (0.013) 0.626  (0.007) 
ρ   0.822 (0.004) 0.759 (0.011) 0.795  (0.005) 
δ   -0.406 (0.007) -0.368 (0.017) -0.395  (0.009) 
Year-specific innovation variances 
2
t v σ  
1974 0.345 (0.012)  0.297 (0.025)  0.311  (0.016) 
1975 0.286 (0.012)  0.298 (0.028)  0.219  (0.013) 
1976 0.235 (0.011)  0.189 (0.025)  0.206  (0.014) 
1977 0.207 (0.011)  0.222 (0.026)  0.175  (0.013) 
1978 0.189 (0.010)  0.185 (0.023)  0.190  (0.013) 
1979 0.169 (0.010)  0.157 (0.021)  0.182  (0.013) 
1980 0.183 (0.010)  0.164 (0.021)  0.209  (0.013) 
1981 0.186 (0.010)  0.199 (0.022)  0.213  (0.014) 
1982 0.186 (0.010)  0.180 (0.023)  0.208  (0.013) 
1983 0.217 (0.010)  0.221 (0.024)  0.212  (0.014) 
1984 0.230 (0.011)  0.221 (0.024)  0.238  (0.014) 
1985 0.212 (0.011)  0.230 (0.024)  0.218  (0.014) 
1986 0.200 (0.011)  0.256 (0.027)  0.218  (0.015) 
1987 0.204 (0.011)  0.221 (0.023)  0.226  (0.014) 
1988 0.235 (0.011)  0.217 (0.025)  0.234  (0.014) 
1989 0.235 (0.011)  0.247 (0.027)  0.233  (0.014) 
1990 0.259 (0.012)  0.249 (0.028)  0.229  (0.015) 
1991 0.274 (0.013)  0.274 (0.030)  0.276  (0.016) 
1992 0.287 (0.014)  0.306 (0.033)  0.296  (0.017) 
1993 0.309 (0.015)  0.320 (0.033)  0.329  (0.018) 
1994 0.325 (0.016)  0.303 (0.035)  0.311  (0.019) 
1995 0.321 (0.015)  0.261 (0.033)  0.317  (0.018) 
1996 0.321 (0.015)  0.316 (0.036)  0.316  (0.019) 
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1997 0.340 (0.015)  0.305 (0.037)  0.377  (0.020) 
1998 0.353 (0.015)  0.379 (0.041)  0.351  (0.020) 
1999 0.357 (0.015)  0.369 (0.039)  0.376  (0.019) 
2000 0.346 (0.014)  0.352 (0.035)  0.360  (0.018) 
Note: The estimated model is outlined in equations (6)-(8). The estimates for each county are 
based on 1004 variances and auto-covariances. Heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Appendix C: Time graphs of crime 
In this appendix we present time series graphs of total crime, shoplifting, auto 
theft, and burglary, for the period 1974-2000. 
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Appendix D: Weighted least squares 
In this appendix we present the results for permanent and transitory income when 
using weighted least squares. 
 
Table D1. Estimates when using inequality in permanent and transitory income. 
Weighted least squares. 
  Total crime  Shoplifting  Auto theft  Burglary 
  (1) (2)  (1)  (2) (1) (2)  (1)  (2) 
Perman. 0.814 0.947  1.815  1.624 0.814 0.947 -0.149  0.080 
 (0.427)*  (0.438)**  (1.029)* (0.997) (0.427)*  (0.438)** (0.762)  (0.732) 
Transitory -0.347  -0.414  0.856  0.535  -0.347 -0.414  -0.609  -0.712 
 (0.252)  (0.259)  (0.638)  (0.668)  (0.252) (0.259)  (0.480)  (0.496) 
Clear-up     -0.054    1.806   -0.054    -0.033 
   (0.231)    (0.495)***  (0.231)    (0.098) 
Unempl. 1.485 1.442  -1.564 0.277  1.485 1.442  2.265  2.057 
 (1.009)  (0.802)*  (2.290)  (2.016)  (1.009) (0.802)*  (1.818)  (1.789) 
Men15-24 4.140  3.818  -8.093  -7.823  4.140 3.818 -0.124 -1.091 
 (3.391)  (3.537)  (13.698) (11.778)  (3.391) (3.537)  (7.408)  (7.607) 
Foreign 3.036  2.211  5.322  4.796  3.036 2.211 -2.630 -3.944 
 (2.430)  (2.624)  (5.335)  (5.264)  (2.430) (2.624)  (5.002)  (5.029) 
Divorced 16.712 12.315 -8.461  -1.835  16.712 12.315  33.906  31.141 
 (6.313)**  (5.955)*  (12.322) (13.096)  (6.313)** (5.955)* (9.361)***  (9.007)***
Obs. 540  520  520  520  540 520  540  520 
R-squared 0.97  0.97  0.99  0.99  0.97 0.97  0.94  0.94 
Notes.  Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. Time dummies, county-specific 
fixed effects and county-specific time trends are included in all specifications. 
Clusatering is made on counties (allowing for autocorrelation in the residuals). 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Publication series published by the Institute for Labour 
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